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Fatal disasters in Bangladesh garment factories demand we learn 
from recent anti-sweatshop breakthroughs. Beginning in 2007, 
workers at Fruit Of The Loom (FOTL) factories in Honduras built a 
uniquely successful global campaign.  FOTL closed a factory and 
laid off 1,200 workers in response to workers’ efforts to improve 
working conditions, a textbook move in the industry’s “race to the 
bottom.” But nine months later, after the largest collegiate boycott in 
history, FOTL reopened the factory and extended union neutrality to 
all its Honduran factories. We argue that the campaign, which 
resulted in a reversal of the transnational’s decision to abandon the 
unionized factory and the direct negotiation between FOTL top 
executives and workers, provides an unprecedented model for labor 
to rein in the apparel industry’s hyper-mobile capital. Since their 
negotiated agreement with FOTL, workers have won significant 
improvements in wages and working conditions, and inspired 
groundbreaking new campaigns to challenge the transnationals 
whose products they assemble. 
 
Keywords: unions, garments, international solidarity, anti-sweatshop, Fruit Of 
The Loom, Honduras 
A3 May 4, 2013, the New York Times editorial board wrote: 
 
                                                        
1 Ashok Kumar is a PhD student of Economic Geography at Oxford University. Born in Chicago, Ashok became a 
labor activist while an undergraduate in Wisconsin. In 2006, he was elected to the Dane County Board backed under 
the Socialist and Green Party banner representing downtown Madison, Wisconsin. As County Supervisor he 
authored and ushered over a dozen pieces of radical legislation in areas including immigrant rights, prison reform, 
affordable housing, and environmental justice. Ashok is a Fulbright Research Scholar and has a Masters of Science 
in Social Policy (Research) from the London School of Economics. His PhD research focuses on transnational labor 
movements and the South Asian working class. Ashok has published widely including in The Guardian and Labor 
Notes as well as recent book chapters published by Verso, Pluto, and French Publisher CETIM. He currently resides 
in East London where he is active on trade union and racial justice issues.  
2 Jack Mahoney lives in El Salvador working as a labor union organizer, and serves as a technical advisor to the 
International Union League for Brand Responsibility. Born in New Jersey, Jack joined the labor movement as a 
college student at Georgetown University, where he organized union campaigns with campus janitors, security 
officers and foodservice workers. In 2009 he served as an interpreter and consultant for the Honduran 
SITRAJERZEESH union during its successful campaign to re-open a shuttered union Fruit of the Loom factory, and 
later became the Domestic Campaigns Coordinator for United Students Against Sweatshops during 2010 and 2011. 
He has a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown. 
3 A version of this paper was presented jointly at the 2013 North American Labor History Conference. We are 
particularly grateful to Jane Collins, Craig Jeffrey, Linda McDowell, Richard Appelbaum, Garrett Shishido Strain, 
Teresa Cheng, Joel Feingold, Jonah Zinn and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
Hundreds of women and men have been burned, suffocated and 
crushed to death in recent years as [Bangladesh]’s garment industry 
has boomed, with Western clothing brands and retailers making a big 
shift to Bangladesh from China, where labor costs are rising. … What 
is needed is direct action by international companies to improve 
working conditions for the more than 3.5 million Bangladeshi workers 
— 80 percent of them women — who toil in clothing factories. … Big 
garment buyers like Walmart, H&M and Gap have tremendous power 
to improve conditions in that market.  
 
For the first time since the 1990s, a devastating tragedy has brought the 
conditions of garment workers back to mainstream media spotlight. Rana 
Plaza, an eight-story building in the Savar District of Dhaka, Bangladesh, was 
one of the world’s 300,000 sites of outsourced garment production for major 
transnational brands (Miller 2008). At 9am on the 24th of April, as over 3,000 
workers worked, Rana Plaza collapsed, quickly becoming the deadliest 
garment factory disaster in history.  By the time the rubble had cleared the 
death count stood at 1,129.  After two decades of varied efforts intended to 
root out rampant violations of workers’ rights in the industry – by companies, 
labor, governments and advocacy groups – Rana Plaza has come to 
symbolize the utter failure to restrain an endless downward spiral of garment 
workers’ power and welfare globally known as the “race to the bottom.” In fact, 
while the garment sector remains “essentially unchanged” after twenty years 
of anti-sweatshop efforts (Anner, Bair, and Blasi 2012, 2), garment worker 
wages in real terms fell between 2001 and 2011 in most producing countries 
(WRC 2013). As Ballinger (2009) states, it is as if “nearly twenty years of anti-
sweatshop activism has come to naught.” 
 
The Rana disaster followed a series of deadly tragedies at export-processing 
factories that epitomize the severe shortcomings of the existing regime of 
labor rights compliance. At least 262 garment workers died and another 600 
were seriously injured when Pakistan’s Ali Enterprises caught ablaze in 
September 2012, just a month after an inspection by a for-hire auditor earned 
the factory a widely-respected but corporate-backed Social Accountability 
International accreditation (AFL-CIO 2013; Walsh and Greenhouse 2012). 
Between 2010 and 2012, inhumane working conditions drove workers at 
Apple suppliers Foxconn and Foxlink to commit suicide, even after the iconic 
iPhone brand began funding controversial Fair Labor Association to 
investigate its contract suppliers (Nova and Shapiro 2012). In a morbid 
metaphor for the failure to deal with root causes, Foxconn addressed the 
mass worker suicides by installing nets to catch workers who, in desperation, 
attempted to jump to their death.  
 
Today the apparel industry’s dominant approach to labor compliance centers 
on “social auditing” inspections conducted by transnational brands and for-
hire monitoring groups, evaluating working conditions against “codes of 
conduct” often written by the same Transnational Corporations (TNCs)4. As 
early as 1992, when the Washington Post documented the case of Chinese 
prison labor in the production of Levi jeans, Levi Strauss responded by 
                                                        
4 There is a vast and growing body of literature that has identified governance measures under different labels, 
among them “soft law” (Cini 2001), “outsourced regulation” (O’Rourke 2003), “self-regulation” (Blackett 2000), 
“privatized regulation” (AFL-CIO 2013), “governance” (Hassel 2008; Levy and Prakash 2003) as well as an “auditing 
regime” (Locke et al. 2012).  We see “auditing” as predicated on self-regulation by TNCs, and a subset of global 
governance.   
becoming one of the first brands to introduce codes of conduct for all their 
suppliers (Hale and Shaw 2001), and other brands quickly followed suit.  
 
From the beginning, there was skepticism towards the auditing regime 
underpinned by codes of conduct. Robert Reich, US Labor Secretary at the 
time said, “codes are not a panacea, no code is worth the paper it’s printed on 
without strict enforcement of its requirements.” Michael Hansenne, ILO 
Director General, stated that, “while these initiatives may be well-meaning, 
there remains no system to ensure that corporations which are fuelling the 
integration of the global economy respect international labor rights” 
(Collymore 1997). Despite these lucid early criticisms, Hansenne’s statement 
still rings true nearly two decades later. 
  
The auditing regime relies on the dubious commitment of TNCs to police their 
own production networks, a core tenet of so-called “corporate social 
responsibility”, or CSR (Devinney 2009). Wary of this conflict of interest, 
advocates created parallel structures that gave institutions like US universities 
a role in the policing, but left the auditing regime itself intact. Universities 
adopted their own codes of conduct, seeking the disclosure of supplier 
factories from brands, and requiring independent monitoring as a requisite 
part of the tendering process for apparel purchasing or licensing contracts. At 
best the system is reactive: workers and advocates used the codes of conduct 
in the public sphere to embarrass TNCs into remedying specific labor 
violations that had already taken place (Anner et al 2012).  But a recent study 
refuses to concede even that ground, claiming the “CSR industry has been 
bad for working people” (see AFL-CIO 2013). The report found that twenty 
years of codes, audits, and other CSR initiatives in the garment sector are a 
façade, and have succeeded largely in providing public relations cover for 
depressed wages and deteriorating factory conditions that have cost 
hundreds of lives in the sector. 
 
Decades earlier, labor unions in the US had power to enforce agreements 
with both employers and apparel brands, as we will discuss shortly.Today 
workers and their unions have no formal power of enforcement in the auditing 
regime (Wright 1993). Despite the search for a viable solution to boost 
garment workers’ structural power, the wages, conditions, and strength of 
workers in the sector has greatly diminished with accelerated global mobility 
and subcontracting (Greven 2008; ILO 2000; AFL-CIO 2013). 
 
Although the Rana disaster has sparked a new concern about the dark side of 
globalized capital, many are unfamiliar with the recent trajectory of the ever-
evolving anti-sweatshop efforts by workers and advocates, the lessons 
learned, and the small but groundbreaking victories that illuminate new ways 
forward. While there is broad recognition of a failure of the industry’s auditing 
regime, there is little clarity on the crucial question of where the anti-
sweatshop movement must go from here5. The most commonly proposed 
solutions regarding worker safety in Bangladesh simply create new auditing 
regimes, potentially doubling down on the errors of the past without directly 
addressing the overwhelming imbalance of structural power between workers 
and TNCs. The most recent incarnation of the auditing regime is the Accord 
on Factory and Building Safety in Bangladesh (“Accord”), which is 
undergirded by a system of independent inspections (see AFBSB 2013). 
                                                        
5 One of the proposed solutions is the International Framework Agreements (IFA).  Within the garment sector the 
only IFA is with apparelt TNC Inditex, IFAs have been critiqued for being non-binding, largely unenforceable, and 
lacking a democratic mandate (see Croucher and Cotton 2009; Miller 2004; Papadakis 2011) 
 
We argue that the Accord, while narrow in its scope, is a historic step towards 
returning legally-binding responsibility to outsourcing apparel TNCs for 
working conditions at contract factories, with some unions even in a position 
to litigate to enforce the TNCs responsibility. However, insofar as such an 
approach conforms to the existing auditing regime, it will fall short without 
successes by workers in strategically important TNCs production networks to 
form union organizations that reclaim workers’ position in directly negotiating 
and enforcing their labor conditions with the TNCs. Historically, non-union 
workers are far less likely to blow the whistle on violations due to a very real 
fear of reprisals (Barnett 1992), union members are more likely to identify 
problems with safety and demand solutions (see Weil 1992), and as a result 
unionized factories are proven safer (Grunberg 1983). 
 
Lance Compa (2013) argues that the Rana disaster “should be a pivot point 
for the global apparel industry,” but cautions against repeating the consumer-
dependent strategies of the past. Instead, he urges for “demands for change 
[to] start to focus on workers’ right to form trade unions.” After arguing for 
strengthening Bangladeshi workers’ unions, Compa points to a union victory 
in Honduras by workers of Fruit of the Loom: 
 
The Kentucky-based company reopened the factory where the union 
dispute arose, rehired all employees, recognized the union and entered 
into good-faith bargaining. Now the renamed “New Day” facility has a 
collective bargaining agreement with higher wages, better conditions, 
and a strong health and safety committee. Workers have maintained 
high productivity levels, and the company has added employees. 
 
On November 14th, 2009, Fruit of the Loom (FOTL), the largest exporter of t-
shirts to the US market in the world and the largest private sector employer in 
Honduras (Doh and Dahan 2010; Anner 2013), announced it would reopen its 
garment factory Jerzees de Honduras (JDH), under the name Jerzees Nuevo 
Dia (JND), or “New Day”.  The final deal, negotiated between FOTL workers 
and executives, included the rehiring of 1,200 employees, a multi-million 
dollar payout to workers, and a commitment to extend union neutrality and 
access across its Honduran supply chain. This paper tells the unique story of 
a garment factory that a TNC shut down in retaliation to workers forming a 
union – as so often happens6 – only to reverse that decision and 
fundamentally change its approach to labor relations. Workers’ successful 
unionizing campaign overcame firings, death threats and nine months of 
unemployment, all whilst maintaining a highly participatory union structure to 
win impressive wage and benefit improvements, creating political space for a 
wave of worker organizing in Honduras and beyond. 
 
During the campaign, workers’ allies in the US, UK, and Canada persuaded 
as many as 132 universities7 to boycott FOTL’s subsidiary Russell Athletic, 
valued at over $50 million (Davis 2010). The campaign became the largest 
collegiate boycott since the movement against South African apartheid, and 
the largest of an apparel brand in history8. The culmination of a long-term 
                                                        
6 For more detailed history and case studies of such closings in Latin America see Armbruster-Sandoval (2004). 
7 This includes all the universities that participated in the boycott by either cutting, suspending, or, in cases where 
the university currently had no business relationship with FOTL, publicly agreeing to withhold orders until 
remediation. 
8
 Comparison by value of contracts lost, based on interviews with former and current leaders of various anti-
sweatshop and labor union organizations including USAS, the former UNITE! and the WRC. 
strategy on US campuses, it was heralded as the student anti-sweatshop 
movement’s  “biggest victory so far” by The New York Times’ Stephen 
Greenhouse (2009). Organizers later declared that it was the first time in the 
modern anti-sweatshop movement that “a factory that was shut down to 
eliminate a union was later re-opened after a worker-activist campaign” and 
the “first company-wide neutrality agreement in the history of the Central 
America apparel export industry” (Doh and Dahan 2010). 
 
The victory came despite challenges. A military coup ousted labor-friendly 
Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelaya shortly after FOTL shut down the 
JDH factory. The 2008 financial crisis gave FOTL a plausible justification to 
close a factory; despite repeat findings by labor watchdogs that the closure 
was intended to jettison trade union activity. The factory had recently changed 
hands with the 2006 purchase of Russell Athletic by FOTL; itself owned by 
Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company led by Warren Buffett, then the 
world's wealthiest person. 
 
A critical examination of the precedent-setting advances at FOTL – and 
related breakthroughs that followed – will assist in developing ideas around 
power building, international campaigning, and the establishment of workers’ 
rights in the clothing commodity chain. We begin by situating the FOTL 
campaign within the history of anti-sweatshop efforts in the garment sector. 
We then explore the theoretical and strategic implications of the FOTL 
campaign, two other campaigns that followed shortly, and a new organizing 
initiative by workers from a dozen countries in Asia and the Americas to 
directly confront apparel TNCs. 
 
Historical Context | For a century, outsourcing has remained the main 
structural dilemma for garment workers. A 1936 New York’s dressmakers’ 
union pamphlet urged its members to strike, declaring: “The union announces 
simply and straightforwardly that the insanity of the unrestrained jobber-
contractor system cannot be permitted to continue unchecked.” In those days, 
outsourcing apparel companies were called “jobbers,” as they decided which 
factories would get the job of making their products. A 1951 report 
commissioned by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) 
(Schlesinger 1951) argues that outsourcing drives down wages and causes 
chaotic instability for workers. In an anecdote that rings true today, the 
pamphlet explains how brands drive the race to the bottom: 
 
A certain large jobber ... had 55 contractors working for him. Twelve of 
these were regularly employed and produced 85% of his production. 
The other 43 received 15% of his production and the signal honor of 
being used as a club to beat down price for all. Lest this seem an 
extreme example, a group of 81 jobbers was studied. Here it was found 
that 37% of the contractors handled 78% of the work, while the other 
63% handled 22%.  
 
To rein in the chaos, the dressmakers demanded a “limitation of contractors,” 
later called “designation of contractors” by the ILGWU. Following a number of 
mass strikes, the unions successfully forced many brands to exclusively do 
business with designated suppliers – unionized factories where brands 
agreed to pay a price high enough to guarantee fair wages to workers and 
reasonable profit to owners (Anner et al 2012). This was enshrined in “jobber 
agreements” negotiated between workers’ unions and the brands, despite 
having no direct employment relationship. The necessity for direct 
engagement between brands and unions was so evident that in 1959 the US 
Congress passed a labor law amendment allowing garment workers to picket 
and boycott the brands despite having no direct employment relationship9 
(Previant 1959).  
 
However, global trade deregulation of the 1990s exacerbated the garment 
workers’ structural disadvantage rooted in global outsourcing that had begun 
in the 1960s. The profound changes in spatial relations exacerbated the 
power imbalance: When a brand pulled out of a union factory in New York 
City and gave the work to a non-union factory in Jersey City, the unionists 
would drive through the Holland Tunnel to go picket the factory and recruit its 
workers10. But when brands started sending the work to Santo Domingo and 
Jakarta, unionists could not keep up. While corporate executives had the 
resources to travel and communicate fluidly across borders, workers faced 
major obstacles in globalizing their movement, not least of which was the lack 
of functioning global union alliances (Stevis and Boswell 2008). The benefits 
and enforcement structures that US unionists had built over many decades 
were designed to fit within US borders, and a nationalistic protectionist instinct 
among some union leaders precluded an aggressive plan to overcome the 
geographical, legal, linguistic and cultural divisions among the industry’s new 
global workforce (Hensman 2011). Rather than a deepening of class 
consciousness and proletarian internationalism due to homogenized 
conditions, US workers often reacted with xenophobia, such as “anti-China” 
campaigns, tailored to maintain the US’ global hegemony (Silver and Arrighi 
2009). Garment workers’ structural power was effectively wound backwards 
one hundred years, setting the stage for a severe backslide in working 
conditions. 
 
United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) was born out of the labor 
movement’s search for a foothold as the floor fell out from under them.    
USAS was conceived in 1997 by student activists working with the Union of 
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE!), a successor to the 
ILGWU. The aim of USAS was to leverage the $4bn university apparel market 
– in which brands get licenses from universities who collect royalties for the 
sale of apparel bearing their names and logos, totaling between one and two 
percent of total US clothing sales overall (Krupat 2002). USAS claimed 150 
chapters across the US with students supporting far-away labor struggles by 
leveraging universities’ licensing agreements with transnational apparel 
brands and the codes of conduct therein (USAS 2013). 
 
Around the time of USAS’ birth, the Clinton administration’s Secretary of 
Labor Robert Reich formed the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). Reich had 
been campaigning domestically against sweatshops, and the establishment of 
AIP set into motion the creation of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) to monitor 
apparel manufacturing. TNCs were quick to fund the FLA and publicize their 
own codes of conduct, while union partners such as UNITE and the Retail, 
Wholesale, and Department Store Union left the FLA shortly after its formation 
(Chatteri and Levine 2005). Student activists soon realized that codes were 
hollow without a truly independent third party monitoring of factory conditions.  
The FLA became, what Ross (2006, 52) calls, “the exemplar of an approach 
to fighting labor abuse known as Corporate Social Responsibility,” asserting 
                                                        
9 Then- Massachusetts Senator John F Kennedy spoke in favor of the amendment, known as the Garment Industry 
Proviso, an exception to the “hot cargo” prohibition that prohibits picketing or boycotting secondary targets, a legacy 
that continues today. 
10 Based on interview with former ILGWU organizing director Jeff Hermanson – August 23, 2013 
that such initiatives along with the FLA itself are “almost useless.” Ross 
continues: “workers rarely know the codes exist, contractors evade the 
standards with relative impunity and lie to auditors, remediation of violations is 
slow, and violations are not public knowledge except as generalizations.”  A 
global industry of for-hire auditors and accounting firms sprung up responding 
to a burgeoning market in factory investigations, each with varying 
methodology and credibility. 
 
Critical of the FLA and rejecting CSR, USAS activists called for the formation 
of an independent monitoring organization, and in 2000 formed the Workers’ 
Rights Consortium (WRC), pressuring their universities to join and fund it.  By 
2005, student campaigns had ensured that over 170 universities had affiliated 
to the WRC, funding full-time factory investigators around the world.  While 
major apparel transnationals were funders and board members of the FLA, 
the governing body of the WRC was university administrators, labor experts, 
and USAS activists. The WRC conducted independent unannounced 
investigations, publishing entire reports working in conjunction with workers 
on the shop floor; while the FLA contracted external monitors publishing only 
report summaries with little transparency as to whether workers were 
contacted at all (Chatteri and Levine 2005).  
 
Soon it was apparent that the WRC auditing regime, too, was insufficient 
(Bartley 2009). When workers overcame the considerable challenges to 
organizing a union or remedying a major labor violation, they would either be 
fired, brands would “cut and run,” the factory would close, or some 
combination of these outcomes. With precious few exceptions, campaigns 
ended with unionists losing their jobs and TNCs denying responsibility, 
regardless of how scathing the report or how thorough the investigation. Two 
major campaigns illustrated this point. Since 1998, US unions and other anti-
sweatshop organizations like USAS and WRC repeatedly intervened in 
support of workers organizing at the BJ&B factory in the Dominican Republic, 
successfully pressuring brands Nike and Reebok to reverse illegal firings of 
unionists. In a historic victory, the BJ&B union became the first in its country’s 
free trade zones to win a collective bargaining agreement (Esbenshade 
2008). But as workers finally won concrete improvements, the factory 
gradually laid off workers due to the brands shifting productions to cheaper 
alternatives. The brands washed their hands of the affair even as their 
production shifts eventually forced the factory to close.  Meanwhile, the 
unionized Hermosa Manufacturing factory in El Salvador abruptly closed in 
2005, stealing an estimated $825,000 it owed to workers, and those who 
organized and demanded their compensation were blacklisted at other 
factories, while the brands Adidas, Nike and Russell Athletic insisted they 
could do nothing to remedy the situation. University of Wisconsin student Jan 
Van Tol (Sexauer 2007) told the university newspaper, “If Adidas' system 
requires this long to resolve even such an obvious case of labor rights 
violations as Hermosa, that system is obviously broken.” The system was 
indeed broken, and activists were already proposing an overhaul.  
 
In 2005, USAS, the WRC and several universities launched an ambitious new 
campaign for the Designated Suppliers Program (DSP). The DSP echoed 
UNITE!’s jobber agreements and the 1936 dressmakers’ demand for 
“limitation of contractors,” but would make universities the enforcer instead of 
unions themselves.  The program would have universities require apparel 
brands to produce at least 75% of clothing bearing the university’s logo in 
factories where workers had a democratic trade union and earned a living 
wage. USAS representatives fanned out around the world to meet with 
garment unionists to develop the strategy. 
 
Given the near-complete absence of qualified factories, universities’ DSP 
would have to rely on the logic of “if you build it, they will come.” By the 2007 
closure of BJ&B, the Dominican factory was one of only five on the list of 
potential DSP-qualified factories11. Prospects for DSP were looking grim. 
Besides the basic logistical obstacle of an ever-shrinking list of worthy 
factories in which to implement the DSP, the program’s opponents alleged 
antitrust violations, halting the process while activists awaited a review by the 
US Department of Justice (DOJ)12. TNCs continued fleeing from union 
factories, the race to the bottom continued downward unabated, and so far 
workers had failed to stop it. The era of jobber agreements, where workers 
were central to negotiating and enforcing contracts with both employers and 
brands, had virtually disappeared. The new regime of auditing and codes of 
conduct left workers without a direct relationship with apparel TNCs, and 
prospects to repair the divide looked dim. 
 
In 2007, precisely in this moment of the movement’s nadir, a group of women 
in Choloma, Honduras, frustrated with their working conditions, decided to 
form a union despite being aware that the odds were stacked against them. 
Together with their coworkers, they would reanimate the tradition of direct 
negotiations between garment workers and TNC executives, revealing the 
capacity for workers to reverse global capital flows away from union factories, 
thereby striking a historic blow to labor’s key obstacles in confronting 
globalized capital. 
 
Despite this impact, only two academic articles have addressed the FOTL 
campaign.  The first is a working paper by Doh and Dahan (2010) that gives a 
general overview of students’ role in the FOTL campaign and compares it with 
the student campaign to divest from Sudan to protest human rights violations 
in Darfur.  The second is a book chapter from Mark Anner (2013).  Building on 
this work, we assess the campaign itself, its meaning for the structural power 
of workers to negotiate better terms and conditions, and its implications for the 
next chapter of the anti-sweatshop movement. 
 
Our methods are founded on standpoint theory to establish a researchers’ 
viewpoint to circumvent the social construction and neoliberal consensus 
while remaining robust. Popularized by feminist researchers, standpoint 
accepts the normative reality of the researcher but does not see the normative 
and explanatory facets as mutually exclusive. Within the feminist context it is 
a means of circumventing the gendered conceptions of knowledge, subject, 
inquiry and justification (see Smith 1999, Jagger 2004, Wylie 2004).  
Standpoint theory has since been incorporated into research into race (Chang 
1993), LGBT studies (Demo and Allen 1996) and social work research 
(Swigonski 1994). Our standpoint is as activists enmeshed within the 
movement of the FOTL campaign13. We write as both researcher and activist 
and such a position does not undermine supposed objective criterion, 
beginning with the assumption that when writing within and about a social 
movement, conducting detached “objective” research is impossible.  
 
                                                        
11 Taken from a September 2006 memo by the DSP Working Group. 
12 The DOJ eventually approved DSP in 2011 (USJD 2011) 
13 Mahoney was a fulltime organizer for the campaigns at USAS and Kumar assisted the campaign in Europe. 
Methods include semi-structured interviews with workers and organizers in 
Honduras and the United States, as well as primary source data extracted 
from union notes, campaign emails, internal documents, collective bargaining 
agreements, and labor contracts. Union organizing efforts in the global 
garment industry have few, if any, real successes, which is one explanation 
for the dearth of research in the area.  Thus, to use a spatial metaphor, we 
are scouting territory with little previous exploration, even groping our way 
around in the dark. 
 
Victory at Fruit of the Loom and Beyond14 | Reyna Dominguez worked at 
Jerzees de Honduras (JDH), in Choloma, the heart of the country’s export-
processing region. She sewed hooded sweatshirts that were trucked an hour 
north to the Caribbean port of Cortés, where they were shipped to the US, 
often to universities, logos emblazoned. Production of exports for the US, 
especially apparel, was on the rise in Choloma following the 2004 signing of 
the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA). 
 
One afternoon in the summer of 2007, Dominguez and four other JDH 
workers walked into the Choloma office of a union confederation called the 
Central General de Trabajadores (CGT).  They described their situation to 
Evangelina Argueta, coordinator of the CGT’s union organizing in the 
maquilas – export-oriented assembly plants.  Together the women made 
plans to build a strong union of JDH workers, despite the well-known threat of 
harassment, retaliatory dismissals, and blacklisting. 
 
Dominguez and her coworkers were not the only FOTL workers organizing. At 
nearby Jerzees de Choloma (JDC), workers began forming a union in March 
2007 and soon affiliated with the CGT. And in May 2007, workers at Petralex, 
a contract factory producing for FOTL, had organized their own union and 
joined the CGT. 
 
By July of 2007, managers at all three factories unlawfully dismissed union 
leaders and members.  JDC fired almost all seventy-two founding union 
members (WRC 2007), Petralex fired all six union officers, and JDH fired 
twenty-five unionists. By October, 145 workers had been unlawfully dismissed 
for union activity at JDC and JDH (WRC 2008).  The union filed a complaint 
with the local labor ministry and alerted international organizations15. The 
WRC investigated and published reports. In turn, students put pressure on 
universities to leverage their multimillion-dollar contracts to pressure FOTL to 
rehire the workers. Though many unionists were re-hired, FOTL soon 
announced plans to close JDC in July 2008. In talks with the unions and 
WRC, the company agreed to transfer the fired JDC unionists to JDH, offering 
priority hiring at JDH for JDC workers after the latter closed. 
 
Meanwhile, Dominguez and her fellow unionists at JDH pressed forward with 
organizing. On July 11, 2008, the union began negotiations with local 
management over a collective bargaining agreement. Negotiations reached 
an impasse on October 3, 2008, after management had been unwilling to 
budge on crucial issues like wage raises. Under Honduran law, this meant 
FOTL would be obliged to submit to a mediation process at the local Labor 
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 Sources here include author’s interview Aug. 31, 2013 with Reyna Dominguez supplemented by information 
sourced from WRC (2007), Nova (2008), and AFL-CIO (2012)  
15 Honduran labor law is rarely enforced, a common practice in export-oriented countries. For more detailed analysis 
on labor law, state and international capital see Hensman (2011). 
Ministry. Instead, on Wednesday, October 8, 2008, FOTL announced it would 
close JDH, then its only unionized factory. 
 
The factory closed on January 31, 2009. The following day, union leaders 
Moises Montoya and Norma Chavarria were at the University of Maryland, 
kicking off the first of various tours coordinated with USAS. The workers 
stated their clear objective: to leverage economic power over FOTL via 
universities, retailers, shareholders and other business partners, until the 
company re-opened the factory and finish negotiating with the union over 
working conditions16. 
 
The “Rein in Russell” campaign that followed17 lasted from January to 
October of 2009.  The college boycott began to snowball as the union leaders 
spoke at public events organized by USAS activists, meeting with university 
administrators to convince them to terminate licensing contracts. Combining 
an “air” and “ground” strategy18, workers met with members of the US 
Congress19, traveled to the Omaha headquarters of Berkshire Hathaway, and 
joined USAS activists to distribute leaflets at retail stores selling FOTL 
products. While activists expanded the leafleting activities across the country, 
JC Penney immediately informed the campaigners they would no longer sell 
FOTL products. Doug Morton, CEO of the retail chain Sports Authority, met 
with activists in Colorado in April 2008, and soon after announced they would 
no longer stock FOTL. The Honduran workers’ local union struggle had now 
become a comprehensive strategy focused on university licensing contracts, 
retail outlets, and even the NBA’s relationship with FOTL subsidiary Spalding. 
The campaign was an all-out assault on company’s profits. 
  
Notwithstanding the crucial strategic role played by USAS and other 
organizations, the Honduran union leaders remained the protagonists of the 
campaign, not limited to the role of a mere messenger to advance another 
organization’s agenda, as is so often the case in transnational anti-sweatshop 
campaigns (see Brooks 2007). In February 2009, two union leaders travelled 
to Omaha, Nebraska, to personally knock on the door of the home of 
Berkshire Hathaway Chair Warren Buffett – later that year, one union leader 
spoke at Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting (popularly called 
“Woodstock for capitalists”), directly confronting FOTL’s then-CEO John 
Holland with stories of death threats and other labor abuse at JDH (Stop 
Sweatshops 2009). But most importantly, when FOTL was ready to discuss a 
settlement in the face of significant harm the company’s bottom line, it was the 
Honduran workers themselves who negotiated face-to-face with top 
executives. 
 
FOTL and workers’ union reached the agreement at a meeting in Washington 
in November 2009. The consumer campaign ended and JND opened its 
doors, but workers’ union efforts were just getting started. In May 2011, after 9 
months of negotiations, JND and the union signed an impressive first 
collective bargaining agreement. It stipulated an immediate wage increase of 
19.5%, with another increase of 7% in January 2012 (USAS 2011; 2012). 
                                                        
16 Informed by interview with Dominguez who went on a separate 2009 campaign tour in the UK. 
17
 See Anner (2013) for a detailed account of the campaign. 
18 Derived from military terminology, union campaigns often distinguish “air war” tactics like pressuring an employer 
via its clients to the “ground war” that centers on mobilizing workers 
19
 On May 13, 2009, sixty-five members of the US Congress sent a letter to Russell Athletic CEO John Holland 
expressing grave concern over labor violations (US Congress 2009). 
 
Wage negotiations in the summer of 2013 added another 9.5% raise for most 
workers (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. A union sign attached to a sewing machine at Jerzees Nuevo Dia reads, "We demand 
fair wages." April 2, 2013. 
In October 2013, the legal minimum wage for factories in Honduras’ free trade 
zones was 4,982.13 Lempiras ($245 USD) per month. The JND unionists 
estimate the majority of JND workers earn over 8,000 Lempiras ($395 USD) 
per month. Workers also enjoyed rare benefits such as free lunch and free 
transportation to and from work – both major expenses for garment workers in 
the region, whom typically may spend upwards of 20% of their salary on bus 
fare and their factory’s cafeteria20. Down time resulting from sewing machines 
in need of repair were no longer counted against a worker’s pay calculation, 
incentivizing management to keep equipment working safely and efficiently.  
 
In September 2013, Reyna Dominguez reported that JND’s production quotas 
are more reasonable than at factories of FOTL’s main competitors, 
Hanesbrands and Gildan Activewear – she estimates workers in those 
factories earn wages approximately 25% lower, and work longer hours.  
Gildan, which competes fiercely with FOTL for shelf space at Walmart and 
other retailers, has bragged that its “low-cost manufacturing” is “giving the 
retailers better margins” than FOTL (Altstedter 2012). It is no coincidence that 
Gildan’s production network has been so riddled with labor violations, from 
refusing to pay minimum wage in Haiti to death threats against unionists in 
Honduras, that workers making Gildan products in four countries held an 
international protest in July 2012 (IULBR 2013a).  
 
Beyond opening JND, the November 2009 settlement agreement included a 
unique provision whereby FOTL agreed to remain neutral to unionization at all 
its Honduran facilities, as well as phasing out “collective pacts” – a particular 
Honduran form of employer-dominated representation (WRC 2009). The 
                                                        
20 Based on a number of worker interviews in August 2013. 
WRC had advocated forcefully for such a proactive measure, given the 
repeated violations of workers’ freedom of association over the preceding two 
years.  Asked why her negotiating commission decided to make this a priority 
in its talks with FOTL, Dominguez replied: 
 
We took the initiative to protect other workers, because obviously when 
they saw the successes of Jerzees Nuevo Dia, the rest of the workers 
would want to organize. So, to avoid the problems of firing and fear, 
this was important. … It has gone well. There are now three unionized 
Fruit factories. 
 
Indeed, the success at JND inspired other FOTL workers to organize.  
Workers at Jerzees Buena Vista (JBV) signed a landmark agreement with 
FOTL winning benefits similar to those at JND.  In addition, workers have 
formed unions at the FOTL facilities VFI21, formerly Vanity Fair International, 
facility in Honduras and Joya De Ceren factory in El Salvador.  As of January 
2014, the VFI workers are in the midst of collective bargaining, expecting to 
win benefits similar to what workers have won at JND and JBV, while the Joya 
De Ceren workers just this month have begun direct meetings between their 
union and local Fruit management. 
 
The FOTL campaign illustrates a model that was developed throughout a 
series of labor struggles over the past two decades.  A union-driven 
campaign, coupled with independent investigation, leveraging economic 
power against the relevant TNCs, in order to ensure face-to-face negotiations 
between executives and workers. What remained fundamentally a worker 
struggle skillfully made the most of the existing auditing regime.   
 
But can this example of direct engagement be replicated with other TNCs? In 
theory, there is reason to be pessimistic due to a number of exceptional 
circumstances. While FOTL does outsource much of its production, the four 
union factories in Honduras and El Salvador are vertically integrated – they 
are subsidiaries of FOTL itself.  More importantly, the factories are a planned 
“industrial cluster”, part of an “location agglomeration” spatial logic, in which 
the dense concentration of capital and labor reduces the spatially dependent 
cost of their joint interactions (Sassen 1998; Scott 2009).  FOTL has invested 
massive amounts of capital in Honduras and neighboring El Salvador since 
the 1990s, employing over 20,000 workers in the two countries alone. Its 
Central American facilities include textile mills, much less mobile than typical 
assembly plants due to the large and expensive machinery involved in 
producing fabric.  Its local management team has been developed through 
years of experience in Central America along with training in the US. This all 
adds up to a significant incentive to keep work in Honduras and El Salvador 
regardless of the union efforts. Generally, apparel TNCs rarely perform any 
production in factories they own, relying almost exclusively on sub-
contracting, removing this particular incentive to tolerate a union campaign. 
The direct relationships involved in the industrial cluster also made it 
impossible for FOTL to deny responsibility for labor relations at its plants, 
whereas a key stumbling block to countless garment union efforts has been 
TNCs stubborn denial of their responsibility to outsourced labor.  While 
workers proved they could collapse the layers of bureaucracy between a CEO 
and workers at a subsidiary of the same TNC, it is not self-evident that a 
similar strategy could unravel the web of contracting and subcontracting 
between workers and the brands at a typical garment export factory. 
                                                        
21 FOTL purchased the Vanity Fair Lingerie division from VF Corporation in 2007. 
 
Fortunately, a pair of campaigns followed that showed similar strategies could 
in fact bring TNCs to negotiate with subcontract workers and take direct 
responsibility for labor violations at outsourced facilities.  In January of 2009, 
two separate Nike subcontracted factories closed in Honduras, Hugger de 
Honduras and Vision Tex (for simplicity, “H&VT”), and denied workers $2.2m 
in severance and other legally-mandated benefits.  The CGT, representing the 
former workers of H&VT, replicated its JDH strategy to demand workers 
received their due.  Nike, the largest brand for both factories (Nike 2010), 
released an early public statement that echoed two decades of denying 
responsibility for subcontracted factories, claiming the “factories which directly 
employ workers are responsible” rather than the transnational brands (Nike 
2010). However, after workers’ trips to universities with USAS resulted in 
several universities canceling their contracts, on July 23, 2010, Nike signed a 
deal with the CGT to pay the severance and health benefits owed to workers.   
 
Similarly in January 2011, the PT Kizone factory in Indonesia closed and its 
owner fled, leaving 2,700 workers owed more than $3.3m in legally required 
unpaid severance.  Some of the TNCs appeared to have learned their lesson: 
Nike quickly chipped in $500,000, Dallas Cowboys paid $55,000, and brands’ 
intermediary Green Textile paid another $1m.  But $1.8m remained. The final 
brand – Adidas – clung to the argument that it was not responsible for 
violations at contract factories.  In addition to working with USAS to sever 
Adidas’ university licenses, the PT Kizone workers’ union received advice on 
organizing and negotiating from the CGT as well as Sitrasacosi, the union that 
formerly represented workers at the aforementioned abandoned Adidas 
contractor Hermosa22.  By then, those two unions had joined others to form a 
new global union coalition, what would become the International Union 
League for Brand Responsibility (“League”). The former Kizone workers also 
joined the League, which provided the workers negotiating advisors before 
and during their meeting with Adidas executives.  In April 2013, Adidas and 
the ex-workers’ union signed a settlement agreement, in which Adidas paid 
the outstanding debt to Kizone workers – a first for the brand, and a sea 
change after their stubborn refusal to pay severance to the former Hermosa 
workers. 
 
Even as these brands directly compensated workers at outsourced production 
sites, both Nike and Adidas were careful not to admit direct liability, 
respectively calling the payouts a “workers’ relief fund” and “humanitarian aid” 
(Greenhouse 2010; Adidas Group 2013).  Semantic acrobatics aside, what 
happened in both cases is unmistakable: TNCs negotiated directly with 
workers from subcontract factories and paid money owed to workers for time 
spent sewing the TNCs products. In particular, Nike’s speedy response to the 
Kizone case after paying the H&VT workers shows an unambiguous shift in 
the structural relationship between apparel transnationals and outsourced 
labor. 
 
A New Day | The cases described above offer potent lessons for the garment 
workers and anti-sweatshop activists. As Compa writes, “The CGT’s success 
in Fruit of the Loom plants has led to a coordinating group of unions 
throughout Central America aiming to persuade more firms to respect their 
organizing rights.”  
 
                                                        
22 The 250 workers at the Hermosa Factory were left without jobs after its closure in 2005.  Workers never fully 
received their legally mandated severance from Adidas or the factory.  
Since 2011, this ad-hoc regional group of unions has transformed into a 
global union coalition dedicated to bottom-up organizing campaigns in the 
production networks of the biggest transnational brands. By 2013, the League 
formally launched, made up of national union federations of garment, textile 
and footwear factory workers in ten countries, from El Salvador to Bangladesh 
to Cambodia.   At several union meetings, from 2011 through the League’s 
public launch in February 2013, various leaders from the CGT and FOTL 
workers’ union made presentations about their victory, explained how it was 
achieved, and urged the unionists from other countries to take up similar 
strategies23. 
 
These unionists have set their sights on an ambitious goal: global bargaining 
between workers and TNCs that would echo the jobber agreements won 
through workers’ industrial action nearly a century ago. In their February 10, 
2013, public statement, the unionists urged workers in their industry globally 
to “use our power to force [the TNCs] to sit down face to face with us to 
negotiate serious solutions to these matters of life or death, dignity or misery.” 
They particularly call for direct dialogue with their first global campaign target, 
Germany-based Adidas Group (IULBR 2013b): 
 
We demand a negotiation between our workplace unions and the 
industry’s highest executives, the true owners of the production system 
and those who degrade our working conditions in order to increase 
their profits. 
 
The FOTL story provides a practical example of the limitations of negotiations 
that do not involve the true decision-makers. Dominguez formed part of the 
union’s negotiating commission both in 2009, with local JDH management, 
and in 2010, face-to-face with top FOTL executives including CEO Rick 
Medlin both in Honduras and in Washington.  Reflecting on the experience, 
she says: “In negotiations here in Honduras with the local plant management, 
they didn’t have the power to make decisions about whether to give ten 
[Lempiras] or more than ten when workers are asking for twenty. They didn’t 
have the power to decide. … With them, we didn’t achieve anything.” If this 
dynamic exists at a factory owned directly by the TNC, it is certainly even 
more pronounced at a contract factory where any increase in prices due to 
labor improvements can cause transnational brands to look elsewhere for 
cheaper production. Speaking favorably of her direct interactions with the 
CEO, Dominguez says, “If Rick Medlin says he can go five [Lempiras] higher, 
he means it, instead of stalling. The top executives honor their word and have 
the power to make decisions.” Such mature dialogue was a relief after the 
union’s futile exercise of negotiating with a party in no position to make 
decisions. 
 
Dominguez went on to argue that the same can be achieved with other 
transnational brands: “This happened, and can happen with another brand, 
because of international pressure.” The FOTL case upended accepted rules 
of the global race to the bottom, laying the groundwork for negotiations 
between CGT and Nike at H&VT and between PT Kizone ex-workers’ union 
and Adidas, pushing the boundaries of TNCs self-proclaimed “responsibility.”    
 
The Honduran workers’ gains may contradict the expectations of scholars of 
labor union politics in the region. While the CGT is considered politically 
                                                        
23 Based on physical interviews with a number of union leaders across Central America including leaders CGT 
leaders and FOTL workers. 
moderate compared to its explicitly left-aligned national union counterparts, 
the CGT garment unionists have taken a militant approach that includes 
strikes and mass participation of workers24. Also, together with the CUTH and 
CTH union centers, the CGT led mass industrial action against the 2009 
military coup that ousted center-left and Chavez-friendly President Manuel 
Zelaya (CGT 2009), and many CGT garment worker activists joined anti-coup 
protests under the banner of “Feminists in Resistance.” This militant response 
might surprise some theorists of “labor imperialism” because the CGT was 
receiving funds that originated from the US Department of State25 for a labor 
rights education program in the garment sector, while the US government 
tacitly supported the coup by refraining in calling it a “coup” and in recognizing 
the new government (McLean, Shane, and Tse 2014).  In this case, the 
evidence is clear that CGT leaders exercised independent agency and their 
political behavior was not simply determined by participating in a program 
funded by the US government26. 
 
Indeed the series of events in Honduras that occurred concurrently with the 
FOTL campaign reveals larger questions around worker organization vis-à-vis 
the state and empire27. The FOTL case reveals a disjuncture between the 
pressures of state bent on attracting foreign investment, a US-led empire and 
its attempt to tame or dislodge worker agitation when expedient against the 
organic struggles of workers on the ground. The CGT’s ability to succeed 
against employer intransigence and a repressive government without 
capitulating to larger geopolitical machinations, if indeed such pressure came 
to bear, remains notable. The Honduran state had no formal role in the CGT-
FOTL agreement, which fundamentally changed labor relations at the 
country’s largest private employer, revealing the state in a subordinate power 
relationship to a TNC – a dynamic the CGT has fully grasped, as has the 
League, informing their strategy of direct engagement with the TNC. 
 
Lessons for Bangladesh | As shown above, before the FOTL campaign, the 
failure of social auditing and codes of conduct was clear, but the anti-
sweatshop movement’s alternative solution was not. But, if in 2007 hopes 
were fading for the implementation of a proactive solution like the DSP, 
unions’ recent victories at FOTL and beyond hold the power to inspire 
ambitious new efforts forward. Here we explore why. 
 
Anner (2011) describes the apparel export industry as embedded in what he 
calls a “triangle of power” of brand-name clothing companies, local suppliers, 
                                                        
24 In the FOTL case, Anner (2011) points out that the CGT began acting more like a radical union after the 
introduction of the collective pacts – an inversion of the “radical left flank”.  
25 The CGT had a program with the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center funded by a grant from the US Department of State’s 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The Solidarity Center is the successor of the American Institute for 
Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which received US State Department funding to encourage innocuous “business 
unionism” and in some cases worked to destabilize “unfriendly” governments, including left-wing governments in 
Latin America (Scipes 2011; 2005; 2000). Some scholars maintain that the Solidarity Center continues the legacy of 
labor imperialism established under AIFLD (Bass 2012) 
26 
In fact, on the contrary, the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center petitioned the post-coup government and Organization of 
American  States  to take measures to protect CGT leaders from death threats related to their opposition to the coup, 
as is mentioned in this leaked US State Department cable (see Wikileaks 2009). 
27 The resurrection of the debate over US global power erupted with Hardt and Negri's (2001) contention over its 
decline in managing the Empire it had spawned.  That globalization has led to a weakening of the regulatory power of 
the state is well founded, but recent scholarship suggests a hardening of the materiality of nations to manage 
capitalism’s crisis tendencies (Desai 2013) with Panitch and Gindin (2013) contending that a number of states 
continue to uphold an imperial system at the direction of the US.   
and the state.  He argues that unions must target all three planks in order to 
ensure the rights of workers.  The CGT certainly targeted all three entities – 
as described above, little progress was made dealing only with local 
management and local authorities, and results came once the union targeted 
brand itself as well. 
 
Separately, Anner (2013) observes that the FOTL campaign’s positive 
outcomes resulted in part from an “empowering frame” rather than a 
“victimization frame,” arguing that while the latter may woo broader support 
with sensational tropes of a helpless oppressed worker, it also is more likely 
to lead to ineffective top-down solutions. As evidence, Anner cites the main 
photo used in much of the campaign’s literature (Fig. 2) as a symbol of this 
insistence on maintaining Honduran workers as the protagonists: 
 
Instead of depicting very young women in the campaign fliers, they 
used two older elected leaders of the factory union, one male and one 
female. And instead of depicting them as vulnerable victims, the image 
of the unionists was one of strength and determination. The solution 
suggested by the message and the image was one of worker 
organization through respect for internationally recognized freedom of 
association rights, not paternalism. This was a deliberate decision on 




Figure 2. JDH union leaders Moises Montoya and Norma Chavarria at University of Minnesota, 
February 13, 2011. (Credit: Minnesota Daily) 
 
During the campaign the union leaders developed the knowledge and skill 
necessary to convince university administrators to sever ties with FOTL and 
finally to negotiate directly with the company’s CEO. Naturally, the activists 
did not shy away from more sensational details – one union leader was often 
brought to tears in public events as she describes death threats she had 
faced and her family’s economic hardship since the factory closed. However, 
virtually every campaign document and press release makes clear that the 
campaign would continue until FOTL was back at the bargaining table with 
workers’ union. 
 
Besides being a clear anti-sweatshop victory, the FOTL campaign was 
unmistakably a success for unions. Greenhouse’s article (2009), the first to 
announce the settlement, features the word “union” or “unionized” twelve 
times, even as it focused primarily on US students’ role in the campaign. That 
the discourse today around the Rana Plaza tragedy tends towards the 
“victimization frame” ought to be cause for serious reflection. US unions and 
NGOs have rallied to end “deathtraps,” and two global union federations have 
negotiated the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (“Accord”), 
which centers on establishing a new auditing system, an inspection program 
funded by transnational brands (AFBSB 2013), and USAS launched its “end 
deathtraps” campaign to pressure universities to require brands that 
manufacture their apparel to sign the Accord.  As Compa warns, “the one-day 
visits and checklist-style monitoring routine in such efforts have not worked.”  
 
In fact, despite its focus on auditing, the Accord takes a major step towards 
restoring brands’ direct responsibility to workers for their conditions. 
Specifically around safety issues in contract factories in Bangladesh, not only 
are brands responsible for financing the costs of repairs and renovations 
necessary to make factories safe, but workers – via the signatory Bangladeshi 
unions – can take brands to binding arbitration to ensure enforcement of the 
agreement – a far cry from voluntary agreements that are the norm in the 
industry (AFBSB 2013). This is perhaps the most important difference 
between the Accord and a parallel effort by a number of US apparel 
companies calling themselves the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety – 
while the latter insists on calling its program “binding,” workers have no way to 
legally hold brands responsible for future safety problems.   
 
However, the Accord’s inspection system is not irreconcilable with union 
organizing; in fact, there is evidence to suggest that the Accord may 
compliment union organizing. The Accord stands apart from other auditing 
systems in that its steering committee includes two Geneva-based global 
unions and one representative from a Bangladeshi union. Plus, the Accord 
explicitly delineates Bangladesh unions role in the mandatory establishment 
of factory-level “health and safety committees”, a well-documented first step to 
ensure safety (Reilly, Paci, and Holl 1995). The agreement stipulates that if 
brands do not hold their end of the deal, the Bangladesh unions that signed 
the Accord can enforce the agreement in the courts of the violating brands 
home country – establishing a precedent for the legally-binding brand 
responsibility to local unions.  Notably, however, the vast majority of factories 
covered by the Accord have no union presence, which poses the prime 
obstacle to its implementation. Thus, while the Accord gives unions additional 
tools to enforce workers’ rights from the factory floor, the tools are practically 
unusable if not in the hands of unionized workers. 
 
Safety issues in Bangladesh are merely a symptom of the global industry's 
deeper structural problem – i.e. globalized outsourcing and the “race to the 
bottom.” The Accord gives workers a tool to fend off the most extreme side 
effects, but has no intention of curing the disease itself.  Accordingly, a 
bottom-up effort to organize and unite workers in the production network of a 
TNC, to struggle and bargain across borders, remains one of the only 
sustainable avenues to confront footloose capital.  Efforts related to the 
Accord are at best a complement to ongoing local union organizing efforts.  
As a conjoiner to Compa’s argument, while a reproduction of ineffective 
auditing methods is not entirely encouraging, efforts to defend workers’ right 
to unionize could operate reciprocally with a new inspection system to ensure 
safe factories. What the FOTL case illustrates is that an auditing regime from 
above is only as effective as worker organization from below actively 
weaponizing it.  
 
Most importantly, Bangladesh unions themselves have shown they will not 
simply wait for top-down policy reforms – to the contrary, in recent years the 
country’s garment workers have been organizing with increasing success.  
One sign is that as of August 2013 forty-five garment factory unions had been 
registered since the beginning of 2013, a sharp contrast to the two registered 
in total in the three preceding years (JDL 2013). By late September 2013, 200 
thousand garment workers had taken to the street for days of mass protest, 
shutting down hundreds of factories, and demanding a 2.5-fold minimum 
wage increase, while factory owners claimed that as long as brands were 
unwilling to pay more their hands were tied (Burke and Hammadi 2013). 
By November of 2013 a government appointed in Bangladesh supported a 
77% raise for garment workers, nonetheless the $66.25 monthly min wage 
remained the lowest in the world. Workers rejected the proposal demanding 
$100 instead, and followed through with days of rioting destroying a number 
of factories and shutting down 100 more (Alam 2014), in a what the late 
historian Erik Hobsbawm (1952) would aptly call “collective bargaining by riot.”  
 
After the catastrophe at Rana Plaza the global anti-sweatshop movement 
finds itself at a crossroads. History suggests that prioritizing a new auditing 
regime, no matter how comprehensive, will do little to attack the structural 
roots of the dangerous, miserable conditions of the global garment industry.  
The alternative is to prioritize aggressive organizing efforts that unite workers 
globally in a direct assault on the true shot-callers of the industry. For 
decades, apparel transnationals have comfortably harvested enormous profits 
behind the curtain of globalized outsourcing. Workers in Honduras and 
Indonesia have begun tearing holes, catching glimpses of a new order where 
genuine international labor solidarity forces those getting the richest must 
meet eye-to-eye with those creating the wealth on sewing machines and 
cutting tables every day. When the labor unions, activists and advocates of 
the global anti-sweatshop movement marshal all of their resources – financial, 
moral, political and human – to support smart, focused, bottom-up organizing 
in major TNCs production networks, workers on the factory floor will radically 
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